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Skunk Works Bill Contains
Some Stinky Provisions

,

To the Editor:
It's hard not to be sympathetic to the Anti-Skunk
Works Corporate Tax Act of 1999, as presented by
Professor Calvin Johnson. (See Tax Notes, July 19, 1999,
p. 443). Who wants to be seen as defending abusive tax
shelters, or, for that matter, who wants to defend that
much maligned species, the skunk?
Nevertheless, I have reservations about the attempt
to codify already existing anti-avoidance doctrines
(Title I of the Act), particularly when that codification
is supposed to have effect throughout the Internal
Revenue Code. Putting substance-over-form, sham
transaction, step transaction doctrines, etc., into
statutory form will have little substantive effect, other
than to increase confusion and create innumerable new
1!'~ interpretational issues to slow down the enforcement
V process.
Why codify? Professor Johnson offers several
reasons, none of which is persuasive. Since looking to
substance has been taken for granted in American
jurisprudence for decades, would codification really
"absolve the courts from accusations of judicial activism"? Even if it would, what does that have to do
with the vast majority of transactions that will never
reach the courtroom? Similarly, would codification
really affect corporate tax opinion writers? Why are
they ignoring time-honored doctrine now?
Professor Johnson notes that many other countries
are adopting (or at least are considering) General AntiAbuse Rules, and that's true. But in many cases, that's
because there isn't an arsenal of judicial (or other)
weapons already available for tax enforcement officials
to use.
One needs to consider an anti-avoidance statute if
one is operating in a relatively formalistic system that
doesn't already have a well-developed substance-overform doctrine. But the United States isn't in that position. We haven't had a push for a statutory anti-avoidance rule, in part at least, because we already have
anti-avoidance doctrines in place. Maybe the doctrines
aren't being enforced - isn't that the real problem
here?- but they certainly exist.
, .
So - what are the new, often very general rules in
~' Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act supposed to add?
-~ Professor Johnson writes that "the doctrines have a
70-year history of interpretation in the courts. The history of the doctrines tames the rules and means that
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they are not monsters or surprises." True enough if
we're tall<ing about the old rules. But how do old judicial interpretations tame new rules with new, and inevitably ambiguous, language? Or if the new language
merely codifies "common law and common sense," as
the report says, what's the point?
When I look at the proposed statutory language, like
any good (or bad) tax lawyer I see interpretational
issues. For example:
The determination of any item of gross income,
deductions, or credits shall be made according to
the substance of a transaction and not its form,
except that taxpayers shall be bound by the form
chosen.
I think I know, in general, what that's supposed to do
because, in general, I know what the substance-overform cases do. But I'd be more comfortable with this
as a statutory rule if I were sure what "form" is supposed to mean in this context.

Why even propose statutory language
that raises interpretational issues like
these, and therefore diverts attention
from the abuses that need to be
addressed?
If I'm a taxpayer, I'm bound by the form of the
transaction, but what's that? The label I put on various
documents? (If so, I won't use labels.) The label someone else puts on my structure? The way I initially report the transaction for tax purposes? Those are different conceptions of "form," and I can find cases
interpreting "form" in each of those ways. Would this
new statutory rule mean that transactions where taxpayers have been able to plan on the basis of substance
(say, like, variations on the bootstrap transaction
blessed in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.
1954)) are no longer going to work? Surely that
shouldn't happen, but why, given the language of the
Anti-Skunk Works Act, wouldn't it?
Why even propose statutory language that raises
interpretational issues like these, and therefore diverts
attention from the abuses that need to be addressed?
"Steps undertaken to accomplish a larger goal shall
be ignored" is another principle that sounds fine in the
abstract, until one stops to wonder what a "step" is
and what a "larger goal" would be (making money,
avoiding taxes, preparing for the Second Corning?).
There's already some judicial understanding on those
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issues, and enforcers are going to look to those cases
anyway. What's the statute supposed to add?
The "tax is not a profit center" and "no negative tax"
rules, relying on present value computations and such,
strike me as unadministrable if taken seriously. They're
attempts to give the illusion of precision. I'm skeptical
that borderline transactions ought to be struck down
on the basis of such suspect computations, and, for the
abusive transactions that we should all be concerned
about, the flimsiness is obvious without the new
statute on the books.

I

Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act is a
"There oughta be a law" reaction to a
situation where there already is a law.

I'm certainly not going to criticize attempts to discern policy, structure, and intent in interpreting
statutes, and I agree with language in the report suggesting that "courts and administration [must] make
sense of the system enacted by Congress before being
sure of the meaning of separate words." But I hesitate
to try to codify that general principle.
And the language proposed to do that lends itself
to ridicule:
The text of the Internal Revenue Code shall be
interpreted to reach results consistent with the
policy, structure, and intent of Congress at the
time that it enacted the provisions.
What provisions? What times are we focusing on when
a transaction implicates (as will often be the case) provisions enacted at different times, often without congressional thought about how the provisions fit
together? Of course we need to try to make sense of
the code as a whole, but I'm at a loss as to how that
proposed statutory provision is supposed to help us
do that.
Title I of the Anti-Skunk Works Act is a "There
oughta be a law" reaction to a situation where there
already is a law. The basic anti-avoidance doctrines are
already on the books. Instead of debating Title I, we
should be (1) urging that the already existing principles
be used more vigorously in enforcement, and (2) advocating the statutory revisions needed to deal with
particular abuses.
Most of the rest of the Anti-Skunk Works Act gets
down to the nitty-gritty. That's where the focus should
be in statutory change.
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